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Abstract. Building on the work originally done for the Enhanced Business Reporting 
consortium of the AICPA, this paper develops a test bed for innovation in business reporting. As 
with flying test beds in aviation, the object is to explore the impact of new technologies and 
techniques rather than to create a product intended for immediate implementation. The starting 
point of our analysis is that if the financial reporting system was being built from scratch today, 
it would look very different, taking into account fundamental changes in the two drivers of 
financial reporting: First, the dominance of market making by professional investors, which 
includes such intermediaries as pension and mutual funds, which is how most ordinary 
individuals interact with the market; Second, the reduction in the variable costs of disclosures to 
technology-enabled firms, while time taking a broader view of the cost of reporting to include 
the opportunity cost to the firm from faulty disclosures and the cost to professional investors of 
having to extract the data they need from statements that were not designed for their needs. 
Taken together, the consequence of these two changes is that a system being designed today has 
to rethink the entire process by which financial data held by the firm is translated into decision 
relevant information by users. This process takes place both within the firm and outside of it, 
with a handover of financial statements taking place at the boundary between the firm and its 
users. Given these changes it is time to ask whether the location of that handover boundary point 
is still appropriate: whether the firm should continue to aggregate and condense information 
extensively before releasing it, or whether sophisticated users would prefer to have access to 
more information in closer to its raw format so that they can manipulate and aggregate it as they 
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see fit. Based on this conceptual model we discuss the building blocks of a 21st century 
reporting system and the technical architecture needed to implement it. It is our hope that this 
paper will help create an open source test bed that will develop new ways to measure, manage 
and communicate firm performance in the 21st century. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Creating a Test Bed for Innovation  
There is a long history in aviation of creating flying test beds: aircraft that 
provides the means to test new and emerging technologies, but which are not 
intended to go into mass production. For example, NASA’s X-29 plane explored 
the use of advanced composites in aircraft construction, a unique forward-swept 
wing and a computerized fly-by-wire flight control system, amongst other 
innovations. The forward swept wing was the aircraft’s most noticeable feature, 
with the odd shape promising unprecedented maneuverability and high speed. The 
problem with this design, however, is that it makes the aircraft exceptionally prone 
to instability in flight and it only avoids crashing because much of the flying is 
done by a computer which makes necessary continuous adjustments of the plane’s 
controls to keep it stable—a process that no human pilot could accomplish in time.  
The concept of a test bed for emerging technologies is exactly what we are 
attempting to do with this project to reengineer financial reporting. And as with any 
test bed, the aim of this project is not the creation of a system of financial reporting 
that can or should be implemented in practice as is, but rather, to explore the role 
that the information technology can play in shaping the nature and characteristics 
of financial reporting. The analogy to the X-29 also arises from the fact that the 
kind of reporting system we envisage cannot exist without that technology, both 
because it is the means by which firms in the digital economy create value and 
because it provides the capability for measuring and communicating that value.  
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Figure 1. X-29 Test Bed  
 
Improving Financial Reporting  
Throughout the history of accounting there have been initiatives to update or 
change the basis of financial accounting, no more so than in the last few years, 
after scandals such as those at Enron and WorldCom shook public confidence in 
financial reporting. To pick but a few of the more prominent examples, the CICA 
undertook its Canadian Performance Reporting Initiative that distinguished 
measuring and reporting “value creation” from “value realization”, the latter, it is 
argued, being the focus of the current system of accounting. The IASB and the 
FASB are currently undertaking a major initiative to jointly develop an improved 
conceptual framework for financial reporting, building on the earlier FASB’s 
Concepts Statements and the IASB’s Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements. This process will necessitate re-examining 
some of the thorniest issues that have faced accountants from the very beginning of 
the profession, such as the definition and scope of earnings, the basis for the 
valuation of assets and the impact of uncertainty. Meanwhile the CFA Institute has 
just released its Comprehensive Business Reporting Model that proposes changes 
to the accounting system that is specifically aimed at meeting the needs of 
investors.  
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All these projects, and the many others before and ongoing, take as their 
starting point the perceived inability of the current financial reporting paradigm to 
adequately measure firm performance and capture firm value, as reflected most 
notably in the increasing importance of intangible assets and the subsequent rise in 
the market to book ratio. While these efforts vary in the degree of change they 
promote and in their underlying reporting models (EVA in the Canadian model, for 
instance), their differences are really ones of emphasis. Few have suggested 
wholesale changes to the way in which markets obtain financial information, such 
as moving away from the current system of quarterly and audited annual financial 
statements, with the focus more on incremental improvement than a total rethink.  
What has been lacking, in particular, is an examination of the role that 
technology has had on dramatically transforming the 21st century business, 
especially large Fortune 500 firms—beginning with PC’s in the 1980s to Enterprise 
Resource Planning Systems (ERP) such as SAP in the 1990s and the panoply of 
digital technologies that make up the networked, real time firm of today’s “flat 
economy”. The problems these changes pose for financial reporting are well 
known, with, for example, SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman recently 
stating in a talk on “Complexity in Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation” 
that: “The current questions about the ability of our accounting and reporting 
framework to communicate meaningful information to investors arise, in part, 
because the economy continues to evolve at a rapid pace, while reporting 
standards and mechanisms are in a ‘catch-up’ mode. Globalization and the 
emergence of new economies and capital markets have increased dramatically. 
Advances in technology, including the emergence of the Internet, faster and more 
ubiquitous communication and other technological developments, have changed 
the way companies do business, as well as changing the types of financial 
arrangements and instruments that businesses utilize. As the business world has 
become more complex, so have financial reports and accounting standards.” And 
yet, as in this speech by Commissioner Glassman, the discussion inevitably returns 
to familiar problems in financial accounting and after having raised the issue, fails 
to consider the role of technology not just as a source of problems for financial 
reporting, but also as a solution.  
The project we propose here is to complement these other initiatives on 
reforming financial reporting by a particular focus on the capabilities of technology 
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to transform the reporting process: by creating a test bed which can be used to 
examine new and different technologies for measuring and communicating firm 
performance that can subsequently be incorporated into a comprehensive new 
model of business reporting, along with the best ideas from the various other 
initiatives that stand the test of time. 
The “Galileo” Project  
The most direct predecessor of this project is the Enhanced Business Reporting 
Consortium (EBRC), which defines itself as a consortium of stakeholders 
collaborating to improve the quality, integrity, and transparency of information 
used for decision-making in a cost effective, time efficient manner. The EBRC is 
the successor to the Special Committee for the Enhanced Business Reporting 
Model, also called the Starr Committee after its chairman Michael Starr from Grant 
Thornton, which was created by the AICPA in response to the collapse of Enron 
and Arthur Andersen in 2000. 
That committee re-examined the proposals presented in the early nineties by 
another special committee, the Jenkins Committee. Despite the fact that its 
chairman, Ed Jenkins, subsequently headed the FASB, only a very small subset of 
the Jenkins Committee recommendations were put into practice, one reason being 
that the late 1990s bull market made its concerns about the adequacy of GAAP 
seem excessive. What the Starr committee would really have liked to have 
determined was whether the malfeasance crisis could have been avoided if the 
improvements to financial accounting and reporting suggested in the Jenkins report 
had been implemented. But since that question is essentially unanswerable, the 
lesson the committee took away from the fate of the Jenkins recommendations was 
that the accounting profession by itself did not have the authority or the ability to 
create a new reporting model, regardless of how good its proposals were. Given the 
enormous societal consequences of changing the reporting system, bringing about 
substantive change requires the cooperation of a much broader set of stakeholders 
in the financial reporting process, and bringing them on board was the rationale for 
transforming the EBR committee into the Enhanced Business Reporting 
Consortium. The enhanced business reporting model consists of five elements that 
are meant to give rise to a more useful and robust system of financial reporting 
(Figure 2): 
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Figure 2: Components of EBRC Model 
 
To help guide the EBRC, the Public Company Taskforce of the Star committee 
created a set of sample reports that illustrate the kinds of enhanced disclosures that 
it feels are necessary and useful for complex organizations in today’s information 
economy. By design, most of these sample reports were not especially “radical”. 
The Starr Committee self imposed mandate was developing a structure for 
voluntary disclosures that “enhanced” the coverage of the statuary annual income 
statement and balance sheet, as opposed to questioning the underpinnings of those 
reports themselves, such as the continued relevance of GAAP. As Paul Herring, the 
chair of the Public Company Task Force wrote during the process that created the 
sample reports: “Formats that follow outlines that are already in general use in the 
business information supply chain are likely to gain faster acceptance than those 
that are new… We will explore potential enhancements to the existing financial 
reporting format but will not consider wholesale re-structuring of the financial 
statements.” The incremental approach of the EBR process is justified in terms of 
change management, although as the failure of the Jenkins Committee indicates, 
caution is by itself no guarantee of acceptance.  
The committee did commission one project, known by its internal code name 
“Galileo”, that was by design meant to push the envelope of possible changes to 
the reporting system. As the EBRC states on its website: “While [the other sample 
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reports] present ideas that are potential enhancements to existing reporting, the 
‘Galileo’ sample report presents ideas that are further departures from current 
practice”. The basis of Galileo was the question: What would a reporting system 
would look like if it was designed from scratch for 21st century firms using 21st 
century tools for a 21st century audience? It is that emphasis which drives the 
inevitable focus on technology, because it is technology and all its consequences 
that define business today.  
The other sample reports do not ignore technology, but restrict its use largely 
for the presentation of reports in a web based rather than paper format. But Galileo 
went further by not just using it as a medium for communication, but by making 
the assumption that a new reporting system must logically arise from that IT 
foundation of the firm and its management. 
Towards an Open Source Solution  
The objective of this paper is to help launch an initiative into technology driven 
business reporting, and to do so in a way that makes use of the characteristics of 
the information age economy to create an environment for the development of the 
concept. What we have in mind is the equivalent of the “open source” development 
model, of which UNIX is the most prominent example, and which stands in 
contrast to changes in the standard reporting model which have always been led by 
bodies “authorized” to do so, such as the FASB or the IASB. As EBRC experience 
demonstrated, such parties are subject to political constraints that constrain the 
scope of innovation. Of course, the danger is that a radical approach would fail in 
translating ideas, however innovative, into action. But, again, a more constrained 
approach has also had little to show for it, and given that one of the characteristics 
of the 21st century economy is that it is a highly efficient marketplace for ideas, 
our hope is that the strength of the ideas for business reporting which a new 
approach might generate will serve as its own endogenous form of change 
management.  
It must be emphasized that this paper does not provide a definitive model of 
business reporting. Doing so would defeat the purpose of creating an open source 
community, even if it were possible for one paper to accomplish the creation of a 
new system of reporting by itself in the first place. Rather, building on the Galileo 
work originally done for the EBR consortium, this paper puts forward one set of 
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ideas and visions with that hope that this will begin a process that will create a 
shared effort on reengineering business reporting from a technology perspective.  
Our intention here is to lay out some of the larger forces that will shape any new 
business reporting model and to describe a general framework to organize the 
thinking of this nascent movement. What this paper really is intended to do is to 
invite the participation of all those who feel that we can and must do better in the 
way in which we measure, manage and communicate firm performance in the 21st 
century.  
We begin by going over the well known shortcomings of the existing reporting 
system. Section 3 then discusses the changes in the fundamental drivers of 
financial reporting and draws out the implications they have on the characteristics 
of a 21st century reporting system. Section 4 puts forward the building blocks of a 
test bed that will help develop that system. These building blocks are intended to 
serve as the foundations upon which a collaborative effort can be initiated to 
develop the reporting system. Section 5 offers concluding comments. 
2. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS REPORTING  
The need for drastic change in financial reporting has been recognized by 
many. When launching the CFA’s recommendations for reforming financial 
reporting to better serve the needs of shareholders, Rebecca T. McEnally, CFA, 
Ph.D., project director of the Comprehensive Business Reporting Model and 
director of the Capital Markets Policy Group for the CFA Centre stated: “As 
businesses develop new products and services, the financial reporting model must 
keep pace to ensure that financial statements are relevant, clear, accurate, and 
complete. Investors worldwide are too often in the dark about the true value of 
companies because accounting practices fail to reflect the economics of today’s 
business operations”. Even blunter was Senator Carl Levin, who condemned “the 
fiction that corporate financial statements had become: companies technically 
were in compliance with accounting rules, yet their financial statements were 
hiding huge debts and other liabilities.” 
There are numerous lists of problems in the current financial reporting system. 
The measurement and implications on earnings and valuation of intangible assets 
tops most of those lists, followed by accounting for derivatives and consolidations. 
The perennial issues of accounting for leases, revenue recognition and non-cash 
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compensation remain, while some problems, such as the recognition of uncertainty 
and the extent to which relevance should trump reliability have dogged accounting 
since its very inception. Since such issues have been discussed ad nauseum 
elsewhere, from academic papers to Senate hearings, it would be redundant for us 
to repeat them here. What is useful, though, is to step back and understand the 
fundamental basis of financial reporting.  
Financial reporting would not be needed if all internal and external 
stakeholders in the firm shared the same information about how the firm has 
performed in the past and had similar expectations as to how it will perform in the 
future. In reality, those within the firm are inevitably in a better position to know 
its state than those stakeholders outside of it. Moreover, the former are not just 
informationally advantaged, but as managers they can actually shape the firm’s 
future performance. This is the fundamental informational asymmetry that both 
motivates and bedevils financial reporting, a reflection of the conflict of interest 
between shareholders who only care about the financial performance of the firm as 
reflected in its market price, and managers who can directly benefit from exploiting 
the firm’s assets. Other stakeholders in the company, such as employees, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, local communities, government agencies and so on have their 
own points of alignment and conflict with management and look to financial 
statements to obtain information relevant to their particular decisions.  
These informational asymmetry and moral hazard issues add the possibility of 
deliberately distorted reporting to the already formidable problem of measuring 
firm performance. Moreover, measuring past firm performance is largely a means 
towards the end of forecasting future performance, for it is only the future and not 
the past that affects firm valuation. Clearly managers can affect the degree to which 
past performance predicts future performance, thus affecting the value of financial 
reporting. 
Adding to these incentive problems are changes in the way in which firms 
transform capital into returns. Once the main function of the firm was to apply 
unskilled labor to physical assets, meaning that reporting which concentrated on 
the disposition of those tangible assets adequately captured firm performance. 
Indeed, even accuracy in measuring assets could be sacrificed for other goals such 
as reliability through the doctrine of conservatism without greatly reducing the 
usefulness of the reports. But firms today create value by the use of such intangible 
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assets as knowledge and the skills of its workers with the result that the relationship 
between its physical assets and its performance is greatly diminished. This creates 
two problems: a pure measurement issue of how to account for the presence and 
role of intangibles and an incentive problem in that this weaker relationship opens 
up a wider scope for managers to manipulate earnings.  
An example of these challenges comes from the decision by Cisco Systems, in 
May 2001, to write-down its inventory by $2.25 billion, an amount larger than the 
inventory value in its books. One explanation is that the write-down related to the 
value of inventories that could be not sold by its suppliers in the value chain where 
Cisco had a contractual or moral obligation. In particular, during the e-commerce 
boom Cisco had offered many of its dot-com customers' vendor financing in 
exchange for sales contracts, while signing contracts itself with downstream 
suppliers in anticipation of tight demand. These obligations were not reflected 
anywhere in the financial statements, thus, in hindsight, clearly overstating the 
firm’s profit potential. Of course, even granting these measurement problems, there 
was also the suspicion that the sheer magnitude of the write-off resulted from the 
use of the well known tactic of the “big bath”, in which if reporting some bad news 
is unavoidable, then the best of a bad lot is taken advantage of by writing of all 
other possible bad news in advance in one shot, thereby creating reserves to boost 
income in the future.  
This example and the difficulty in disentangling its purpose are indicative of 
the difficulty that users face today with financial reports. This is not an example of 
fraud, but rather an example of what is arguably a far more compelling problem: 
the systematic inability of the current financial reporting system to meet the needs 
of users to understand the ways in which complex organizations perform and to 
hold their managers accountable.  
This example also undermines one of the arguments in support of the current 
financial reporting system and against changes to that system: the need to maintain 
comparability and consistency across firms in the ways in which they account. In 
the case of Cisco, even long established and relatively uncontroversial rules on 
inventory valuation could not guarantee that different firms will apply those rules 
in the same way given the underlying ambiguity about what is being measured. 
This is really an argument for more information disclosure to enable stakeholders 
to better discern the purpose and meaning of each transaction. 
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3. A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR REENGINEERING FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS  
The Changing Drivers of Financial Reporting  
The Concept Statements that underlie the current US financial reporting 
systems state that “Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to 
present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational 
investment, credit, and similar decisions. The information should be 
comprehensible to those who have a reasonable understanding of business and 
economic activities and are willing to study the information with reasonable 
diligence.” [Paragraph 34, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1]. 
That information is communicated principally through the mandated financial 
statements: “Financial statements are a central feature of financial reporting. They 
are a principal means of communicating accounting information to those outside 
an enterprise.” [Paragraph 6 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1].  
Of particular significance is how the quality and nature of the information 
conveyed by those statements is determined: “Whether at the level of the Board or 
the individual preparer, the primary criterion of choice between two alternative 
accounting methods involves asking which method produces the better—that is, the 
more useful—information. If that question can be answered with reasonable 
assurance, it is then necessary to ask whether the value of the better information 
sufficiently exceeds that of the inferior information to justify its extra cost, if any. If 
a satisfactory answer can again be given, the choice between the alternative 
methods is clear.  
The qualities that distinguish ‘better’ (more useful) information from ‘inferior’ 
(less useful) information are primarily the qualities of relevance and reliability, 
with some other characteristics that those qualities imply. Subject to 
considerations of cost, the objective of accounting policy decisions is to produce 
accounting information that is relevant to the purposes to be served and is 
reliable.” [Paragraphs 14 and 15, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 
2].  
We have quoted these at length in order to give some context to the issues that 
face any proposed changes to the financial reporting system. The current joint 
project of the IASB and the FASB to converge their conceptual statements attempts 
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to deal with some of the shortcomings in these original conceptual statements that 
have emerged over time. That process is has just begun and it is pointless for us to 
attempt to replicate or replace it. But it is useful to see at this highest level what 
drives financial reporting, of which we focus on three issues:  
1. The users of financial information and their capabilities. As the quote 
above indicates, such users are no longer considered to be the 
unsophisticated “widows and orphans” that apocryphally motivated the 
passage of the original securities acts in the 1930’s, at the height of the 
Great Depression. But having a “reasonable understanding of business and 
economic activities and are willing to study the information with 
reasonable diligence” seems to be a rather minimalistic description of the 
investment bankers, hedge funds, credit rating agencies and institutional 
investors that dominate financial markets today. A 21st century reporting 
model would surely give greater prominence to these sophisticated 
players—and the technology that they utilize to arbitrage even the slightest 
price discrepancy—that make the market today, as opposed to passive 
investors who enter the market largely through such intermediaries as 
mutual and pension funds.  
Indeed, while fifty years ago private investors owned over 90% of all 
shares outstanding of US firms, their stake has plummeted to only around 
30% with the share of ownership by such large financial institutions as 
pension funds and mutual funds having increased in the same time period 
from under 10% to almost 70%. Moreover, while in decades past such 
large equity holders had an asset turnover in their portfolios of less than 
20% per year, in the last few years that rate has shot up astonishingly to 
over 90%, which suggests a far more dynamic trading strategy, 
accompanied by very different informational needs. The issue of how users 
use information and what form they get it in is intimately connected with 
the costs of financial reporting.  
2. The Costs of Financial Information Processing and Reporting. The 
costs of preparing financial information clearly affected the original focus 
on the annual financial statements as the “central feature of financial 
reporting”. They serve as summary measures of the state of the firm and its 
performance. Such summarization and condensation inevitably results in a 
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loss of information which cannot be in the best interest of users unless the 
measure perfectly captures future firm value, or the costs of more detailed 
information exceed its benefits to users. What is the cost of preparing 
financial statements? The answer to that question is often complicated by 
the conflation of the potential cost of reporting in general, and the specific 
cost of meeting the current financial reporting standards. In other words, 
the cost induced by such complex standards as those on pensions or 
derivatives should not be taken as indicative of the cost of meeting any 
standard, current or proposed.  
The fact is that the cost of maintaining and reporting accounting 
records has fallen dramatically with the development of software and 
electronic stock keeping. Thus an ERP system such as SAP can generate 
innumerable reports on a continuous basis without the need for the manual 
closing and reconciliation of ledgers that used to characterize accounting 
for much of its history. Data entry is increasingly automated thanks to bar 
coding and soon, with RFID chips, and the key change accounting 
software makes is to change data processing and report preparation from a 
variable to a fixed cost. That fixed cost keeps decreasing thanks to Moore’s 
Law, the rise of manufacturing in China and the various other factors that 
have made IT so much more cost effective in the last few years, and which 
accountants can take advantage of.  
It is also important to put the costs of disclosure against two other 
costs: the first is the opportunity cost when faulty disclosures harm the 
company, for example, by increasing its cost of capital. The other is the 
cost to the user of deciphering the firm’s financial statements. It has been 
argued that the rationale for the highly aggregated system of annual 
statements is to lower the cost to the user of understanding the 
complexities of accounting. But today many users complain that the 
statements conceal more than they reveal and that a great deal of costly 
analysis is needed to reverse the accounting and find out what the 
statements are really saying about firm performance. Learning how to do 
this process of “peeling the onion” of financial statements, is, after all, the 
purpose of all the classes that are taught on financial statement analysis. As 
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) state: “Financial accounting standards allow 
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companies considerable flexibility in determining which accounts are 
aggregated into the individual line items in the primary financial 
statements. Because of the difficulty inherent in assessing the relevance 
and persistence of these amounts, users of financial accounting 
information often must sort through voluminous notes and non-financial 
information to effectively forecast the future earnings, cash flows, or 
intrinsic value of a company. This wide dispersion of value-relevant 
information increases the direct and indirect cost of valuation activities.”  
The CFA puts argument about the cost of financial reporting from the 
perspective of their members, the existing shareholders, this way: “the 
most compelling argument for requiring that the reporting changes be 
made is that if investors must transform financial statements, and the 
information they contain, into a different form so that they can use the 
information in their decision making, then the statements and information 
should be presented in that form in the first place.”   
The issue of the costs of disclosure, however, is much more likely to 
be raised in terms of the physical cost of issuing financial statements than 
of the user in deciphering them, or even of the opportunity cost to the firm 
itself of incomplete disclosures. That is certainly the only way in which the 
term “cost” is used in the FASB Concept Statements cited above which 
states that disclosing better information can only be justified “subject to 
considerations of cost”. As the CFA and others argue, a 21st century 
reporting system needs to depart from a perspective that seems to serve 
solely the interests of managers who wish to hide behind obscure financial 
statements by claiming that any expansion in transparency is too costly. 
The bottom line is that either in terms of the physical costs of disclosure, 
the total costs that encompasses the cost to users of deciphering financial 
statements and the opportunity costs to the firm of faulty disclosures, all 
forces today indicate that there should more rather than less disclosure, 
which raises the final issue we focus on in this section, of the process by 
which financial statements are prepared. 
3.  The process of financial reporting. Financial reports are the outcome of 
an accounting process in which data held by the firm is transformed into 
publicly released information. At present that process involved a great deal 
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of summarization, aggregation and condensation of information, the extent 
of which can be gauged from looking, for example, at the income 
statement of a gigantic conglomerate like General Electric, which reduces 
the activities of a company with $150 billion in revenues and a “portfolio” 
of half a dozen operating businesses, each with individual units and 
divisions all over the world, to a financial statement no more than one page 
long.   
What is the rationale for a process that clearly leads to a great deal of 
information loss? It is clearly an outcome of the assumptions made earlier 
about the capabilities and needs of the users of financial information and 
the direct costs to the firm of preparing financial statements. Statements 
meant for “widows and orphans” look very different from that desired by a 
hedge fund manager contemplating a buyout of a firm. The scope of 
reporting when statements were prepared manually should differ from one 
generated by the push of a button on the firm’s ERP system. The question 
is whether the changes in these two fundamental drivers of financial 
reporting have been adequately reflected in the evolution of financial 
reporting. Clearly users such as the CFA, and even preparers such as the 
AICPA which instigated the EBRC or the CICA, feel that they have not. 
An additional factor in the development of the current systems of reports is 
that for much of the early history of accounting, its purpose was not 
providing information to investors but the stewardship of the firm’s 
physical assets. This shift from the stewardship function toward valuation 
and comparative evaluation necessitates a broader, future oriented set of 
information.  
As financial statements have proven to be insufficient for the needs of 
more sophisticated users, they have been expanded periodically in response 
to demand or the latest scandal, in a largely haphazard fashion. In some 
cases, the statements themselves have been reconfigured (for example, to 
allow mark to market accounting to reduce the dependence on historical 
cost) or else additional information has been provided outside the 
statements, through the use of footnotes and the MD&A statement 
qualitative strategic information. But the centrality of the statement based 
reporting, as codified in the FASB’s Concept Statement No. 1 has been 
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retained, along with their underlying implicit assumption that it is 
important to restrict the scope of information provided to users in order to 
avoid overwhelming them (akin to the recent proposals for a condensed 
and simplified version of mutual fund prospectuses). The end result is a 
highly aggregate, episodic flow of information from the firm in which a 
small set of standardized information attempts to satisfy the widely varying 
needs of users.  
This approach also implies that auditing is also centered on the 
mandated financial statements. Thus auditing is also episodic and focused 
largely on whether the firm has correctly condensed and aggregated its 
information into those statements (which is what “prepared in accordance 
with GAAP” literally means). Validating information on a more concurrent 
basis is held to be outside the scope of the external auditor and assigned to 
the internal auditors instead. But it has also become steadily apparent that 
the mandated statements cannot be considered independently of the 
underlying firm data and the firm’s accounting and control infrastructure 
that gives rise to that data and records, manipulates and aggregates it. 
Thus, as with financial reporting, auditing has been periodically expanded, 
albeit also in a largely haphazard fashion, first to encompass general 
examination of controls, and with the passage of Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to a detailed attestation of financial reporting 
controls. The lack of other audited information has also resulted in auditors 
becoming insurers of last resort, as users who are forced to view the firm 
through those statements come to see the auditors as gatekeepers for the 
firm, and so hold them responsible not only for the accuracy of their 
accounting representations, but for the decision relevance of their content. 
With the financial reporting environment almost exclusively focused 
on the income statement and the balance sheet it is not surprising that at 
least some actors in financial markets have also have tended to view a firm 
largely through the prism of those documents. In an extreme, this can lead 
to forms of functional fixation, where form can trump content, as when 
information in the statements themselves dominate the market’s reaction 
even when information in footnotes modifies or contradicts it. In turn, 
firms expend vast resources in fighting accounting changes that impact the 
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income statement even if that same information is presented elsewhere and 
could be readily used to recalculate the reported numbers, as in the 
ongoing debate over stock option expensing.   
On the other hand, financial markets today are increasingly dominated 
by professionals who are not only capable of handling highly disaggregate 
financial data and forming their own conclusions about it, but actively do 
so. Thus some analysts use the financial statements issued by firms as a 
resource from which they extract specific information which they insert, 
along with other external information, to construct their own independent 
model of firm performance, and discard the version presented in the 10K. 
The point that their representatives, the CFA, makes is that this is a 
roundabout procedure prone to distortion and error that can be avoided by 
giving their members the information they want in the form they need in 
the first place. 
In summary, our working hypotheses are that a) the focus of the financial 
reporting system on the mandated statements constrains the analysis that users are 
able to perform, and, flowing from that, b) the lack of other instruments of 
communication lead firm managers to use those statements to signal information, 
requiring a continuing focus on the form of those statements, independent of their 
content; and c) the fact that assurance is provided on only those statements means 
that they have to receive disproportionate weight, regardless of their information 
value.  
Towards a 21st Century Reporting Model  
Our conclusion from this analysis is that if the financial reporting system was 
being built from scratch today, it would look very different, taking into account 
fundamental changes in the two drivers of financial reporting. First, the dominance 
of market making by professional investors which includes such intermediaries as 
pension and mutual funds which is how most ordinary individuals now enter the 
market (including presumably, any remaining widows and orphans). Indeed, even 
those remaining individual investors, such as day traders, are probably far better 
educated about markets and have access to far more analytic resources and 
information from online and media sources than even the plutocrat investors of the 
1930s, dependent on their ticker tape machines. Second, a 21st century reporting 
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system would also take into account the reduction in the variable costs of 
disclosures to technology-enabled firms while at the same time taking a broader 
view of the cost of reporting to take into account also the opportunity cost to the 
firm from faulty disclosures and the cost to professional investors of having to 
extract the data they need from statements that were not designed for their needs. 
The fact is, as SEC Commissioner Glassman acknowledged, “reporting standards 
and mechanisms are in a ‘catch-up’ mode” and have failed to keep pace with users 
increasing sophistication or the power of their technologies which operate in very 
different ways from the manual systems that existed when the current reporting 
systems had their genesis.  
Taken together, the consequence of these two changes is that a system being 
designed today has to rethink the entire process by which financial data held by the 
firm is translated into decision relevant information by users. The first thing we 
have to do is to recognize that this financial reporting process takes place both 
within the firm and outside of it, with a handover of financial statements taking 
place at the boundary between the firm and its users. By contrast, that part of the 
process external to the firm certainly does not receive the same weight as the 
concerns of the firm preparing the statements in the FASB’s Conceptual 
Statements, as the CFA notes with some chagrin. However, as the forces affecting 
the costs and benefits of financial information have changed, it is time to ask 
whether the location of that handover boundary point is still appropriate: whether 
the firm should continue to aggregate and condense information extensively before 
releasing it, or whether sophisticated users would prefer to have access to more 
information in closer to its raw format so that they can manipulate and aggregate it 
as they see fit, meaning that they don’t have to take as given the choices of either 
the firm or the standard setters.  
That is not to say that firms will not prepare income statements and balance 
sheets, or that they will not retain their centrality in reporting. But the question is 
whether users should be restricted to that one perhaps self serving method of 
aggregation and condensation or whether they should be allowed to better see how 
that report was created in the first place—thus allowing them to make an informed 
judgment as to whether the statements can be accepted at face value or whether it is 
more appropriate to use the data underlying that report as inputs into their own 
models of firm performance. Reducing the emphasis on the income statement and 
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balance sheet will not only increase the scope of information available to the 
market, but would also reduce the likelihood of functional fixation, since it would 
become clearer that the format chosen by the firm in accordance with GAAP is just 
one way of presenting that information, and not the only way.  
Admittedly, any recalibration of the financial reporting process would require 
many critical issues to be addressed, including a) the tradeoff between meeting the 
needs of sophisticated users for more data against the concerns of the firm’s 
managers about revealing competitive data, b) what is gained and what is lost when 
firms process information less and users have to do more, and c) how much 
assurance will be provided with the information and who will provide it.  
These three are not independent issues, since aggregation is an extreme form of 
information processing in which a great deal of information is potentially lost. It 
also allows for those who have access to the raw information, the firm’s managers, 
to shape the degree and form of summarizing that suits their interests best. At 
present, managers constrained only by their ability to get their interpretation of 
GAAP through the auditor, direct their energies towards making one metric of firm 
performance, earnings per share, as favorable for them as possible. Reducing the 
degree of pre-processing and aggregation of information by the firm would 
presumably also reduce the ability of firm managers to manipulate that 
information. On the other hand, it would put more of the burden on users to 
understand perhaps complex, firm specific accounting issues, and while some, such 
as those the CFA represents will clearly welcome this, those closer in capability to 
the “widows and orphans” may not—assuming that they actually depend on the 
information directly in the first place, as opposed to leaving such matters to 
professionals in mutual and pension funds.  
A reengineered financial reporting system will inevitably impact the role of 
auditing. If more information is issued more frequently, auditing will have an 
impetus to move away from an annual focus towards a more continuous auditing 
model. Moreover, with more disaggregate information being reported, auditing will 
also shift its emphasis away from verifying the way in which the firm aggregates 
and condenses its data, towards a broader conceptualization of assurance, 
particularly data-level assurance.  
This conceptualization of the forces driving the reengineering of the financial 
reporting process is not unique to us. While not all will agree with all the 
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particulars describe above or draw the same conclusions, it is in broad terms the 
underlying motivation behind the initiatives of the CFA, the CICA and the AICPA 
amongst others, and shades of these views can even be detected in the 
harmonization project of the conceptual models of the IASB and the FASB. 
However, starting at the same starting point does not guarantee ending up at the 
same place. Political and constituent pressure will lead the bodies behind the 
various initiatives to produce outcomes that vary in the degree of change that is 
proposed.  
Building on the mandate imposed by the EBRC on the Galileo project to 
“presents ideas that are further departures from current practice”, we build on this 
foundation a test bed for innovative, technologically enabled solutions to the 
problems of financial reporting. The aim is to complement the more pragmatic 
approaches to change with a test bed for the development of advanced tools that 
will slowly be integrated into the change process. 
4. BUILDING BLOCKS OF A FINANCIAL REPORTING TEST BED  
Our test bed for a new financial reporting system is built on the foundation 
outlined above, of sophisticated users, technology driven decreases in the direct 
costs of report preparation and increases in the demands for data of the technology-
enabled analytic models of users and a rethinking of how much manipulation of 
data is undertaken by the firm as opposed to users. Moreover, technology is not just 
the underlying cause of these changes in the drivers of financial reporting, but is 
also extensively relied upon as the medium and the enabler of the test bed. As with 
the X-29, without technology this model will crash and burn. And to continue that 
analogy, decisions have to be made at this stage as to the basic parameters of the 
test bed—the equivalent to the shape of the wings in the X-29. Doing so inevitably 
results in taking a general goal that may have widespread acceptance and reducing 
it to a more constrained model whose particulars may generate considerable 
disagreement. But disagreement is a perquisite for debate and we welcome it as the 
driver of progress rather than something to be avoided. Recall that by definition 
this project differs from others, such as the EBRC, in that it does not eschew the 
possibility of radical innovation because of the need to maintain a consensus.  
With that caveat we lay out our personal conclusions about how the changes 
described above would affect a 21st century reporting system. These conclusions 
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serve as the fundamental building blocks for our test bed, upon which a more 
detailed structure can be constructed and “flight tested”.   
BB1: One Set of Books  
It is an old saw in business that firms maintain multiple sets of books, one that 
tells the real story of the firm which is only made available to managers, and 
another set of accounts that is reported to external parties. To some extent that 
dichotomy may have made sense in a world of highly aggregated and simplified 
reporting to unsophisticated users in which using financial statements for internal 
management purposes could lead to flawed decision making. But it hardly can be 
justified when one of the main uses of financial reports by users is in assessing how 
well management is running the firm and what future prospects they see for the 
firm and its assets. Firms in today’s information age economy, where value is 
driven by knowledge and technology, have to be run using sophisticated 
management control and measurement systems. That is what managers look at, and 
the output of that control system is what users—especially the hedge funds that 
increasingly drive markets today—would like to access and evaluate for 
themselves, to the degree that confidentiality of proprietary information makes 
possible.  
The main point, however, that we draw from the prior analysis of the 
technological drivers of financial reporting change is not that reporting based on 
one set of books is desirable, but that it is already here. Firms today in a very real 
sense consist of a series of processes built on a large, common dataset, to be 
specific, a data warehouse, which is defined as “the ‘single point of truth’, the 
‘corporate memory’, the sole historical register of virtually all transactions and 
important operational events that occur in the life of an organization”. With the 
creation of such a system providing instant access to such a comprehensive set of 
data, financial reporting becomes to a large extent just a subset of the possible uses 
of the data warehouse. While a critical element of financial reporting consists of 
subjective judgments, such as of contingent liabilities, nonetheless much of 
financial accounting is comprised of aggregates of transactions and once a data 
warehouse exists, reporting those is for all practical purposes, no more costly than 
pushing a button. Thus in our test bed internal and external reporting will be based 
on the same underlying data, based on the same underlying MC system, differing 
118  The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research                                     Vol. 8, N. 14 
only on—to use appropriately, a term borrowed from XML concepts—the 
stylesheet which determines presentation format.  
Importantly, a data warehouse and the analytic and reporting software it 
supports is not created just to prepare an annual income statement and balance 
sheet, but because it supports the management control systems that help run the 
company. This is a revolutionary development as far as the cost of financial 
reporting is concerned, a matter of such great concern to the writers of the FASB 
Conceptual Statement, because it essentially means that financial reporting (at least 
of its non-subjective components) is a bonus that comes for free with the 
construction of the firm’s management control systems. For example, SAP comes 
with built in modules for financial reporting, activity based costing and even 
auditing, Moreover, being an endogenous part of the management control system 
means that the financial reporting system can built upon and takes advantage of the 
very sophisticated sensing and measuring capabilities of that ERP based control 
infrastructure of the firm that helps populate the data warehouse with fresh data on 
a real time basis.  
The key point of the one set of books building block is that when financial 
reporting arises organically from the management control system, it shifts the 
burden of proof from demanding information to supplying it. There may well be 
good reason in terms of proprietary information to obscure the details of sensitive 
firm data, but it much harder to make the old argument that is too costly to report 
something, such as segment data, when that data already exists in, or can be easily 
constructed from, the data warehouse. In other words, once the cost obtaining 
transactional financial reporting information is eliminated, the basic presumption 
will change from “does releasing more information satisfy the cost versus benefits 
criteria” to “what justifies not releasing this information, since it is freely 
available?”  
It is this shift to one set of books with financial reporting a subset of the firm’s 
management control data system that makes it feasible to open up for debate the 
fundamental question, discussed above, of where the boundary should be drawn 
between internal and external reporting and the degree of pre-processing the firm 
should undertake before release, versus letting users have access to more of the 
underlying content of the data warehouse.  
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Technical architecture to implement BB2 in test bed:  
• Based on the holistic view of the corporation, drawing on integrated 
corporate ERP systems, any remaining legacy systems and Web facing 
systems. On top of these a monitoring and control layer aimed at comparing 
corporate measures and corporate performance models (Figure 3).  
• An OLAP  (Online Analytical Processing) cube display allows for the 
aggregation and analysis of the data in the warehouse to meet various 
management needs, including internal control, financial reporting and 
comparison, auditing and customer relationship management. The OLAP 
layer allows for the extraction from corporate systems of an aggregate 
multidimensional view whereby, for example, sales figures can be drilled 
down into sales by department, sales by product, sales by program or sales 
by job function. 
• Transactions enter the warehouse tagged in a XML derivative language, 
such as XBRL and XBRL-GL, to facilitate subsequent analysis as the 
OLAP level and reporting both internally and externally.  
• Given the differing needs of a wide variety of stakeholders, both internal 
and external to the firm, stylesheets as in XML will allow for multiple 
types of pre-prepared reports (figure 4). 
• Not on paper – a flat static model on paper cannot adequately represent the 
characteristics of an ongoing business. The model must be dynamic in 
presentation, able to show variable hierarchies, and able to be re-organized 
across the user needs. 
• The different users of can benefit from a wide set of information support, 
rich in visuals such as graphs and other forms of corporate representation 
including Web enriched video and audio explanation of key issues. 
• External reports are to be XBRL – XML – enabled for intra-company and 
inter-company interoperability as well as easy flow down the data value 
chain.  
o XBRL/GL enabled general ledger accounts 
o Enriched footnote with tagged content 
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o Taxonomies of key types of footnotes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The monitoring and control layer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Basic Stakeholder Driven Disclosure Technology 
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BB2: When in Doubt, Disclose the Facts  
BB2 is the founding principle of the new reporting paradigm: that users should 
have the opportunity to process data as they see fit, rather than having to accept a 
one size fits all method chosen by the firm or by accounting standards. In short, to 
err on the side of less pre-processing, not more. It is the immediate conclusion from 
the hypothesis outline above, that user of financial reports today are not 
unsophisticated “widows and orphans” with limited ability to process financial 
information. Rather, users are financial intermediaries, such as analysts, fund 
managers and institutional investors whose main problem is a lack of information, 
not information overload.  
A new reporting system must start with this reality and ensure that while the 
needs of those consumers who only want the summary now provided by the 
mandated financial statements continue to be met, the needs of the more 
sophisticated users are also catered to by providing more disaggregate information 
not processed by the firm or screened through a GAAP filter. The advantage of 
BB1 is that it provides the test bed with the capability of stylesheet driven system 
of different reports for different users. Getting away from “one size fits all” means 
that users who only want the one page income statement summary of firm 
performance do not constrain those who want to make their own assessment based 
on the underlying data—or vice versa. Another advantage of this increased reliance 
on rawer data is that it avoids delays in the release of information until a consensus 
can be reached on the “best” way to process the information, which almost 
inevitably results in a common denominator approach that reduces the usefulness 
of the disclosures.  
For example, one of the main controversies facing accounting today is option 
based compensation: whether they should be counted as an expense in the first 
place; if so, whether as a line item on the income statement or only in a footnote; 
and how the options are to be valued in the first place. Disagreement over the latter 
is often cited by firms are reason to delay indefinitely any final decision on the first 
point. Especially in a setting such as this, where legitimate arguments on all sides 
preclude consensus, BB2 provides the solution of letting the market decide by 
using the technical architecture of BB1 to allow the users to see the data in many 
different ways and make up their own minds with all the possibilities in front of 
them and not just one. For example, income with and without expensing, footnoted 
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and as a line item and under various valuations schemes, such as Black-Scholes 
and binomial. Indeed, if sufficient granularity is provided to the data, users would 
be able to recalculate some aspects as they saw fit. This illustrates the mixing of 
analytic and computer technology to improve the reporting model in ways that 
were not even conceivable a decade ago. 
To give another example, consider the continuing challenge of asset valuation. 
While much of the traditional balance sheet currently uses some form of modified 
historical method, with inflation or just the passing of time, the accuracy and 
relevance of historic cost valuations tends to decrease. Furthermore with the 
evolution towards an information society, the most valuable intangible assets tend 
not to be valued on the reports at all. In order to present a more relevant economic 
measurement, more complex and stochastic approaches will have to be adopted. 
The literature makes distinctions such as exit value valuation, current cost, market 
value, replacement cost new, and now fair value. The drawback is that many of the 
proposed alternative valuation methods are inexact and potentially very costly to 
utilize and all highly subjective, meaning that any gain on the relevance objective 
is at the expense of reliability. 
Consequently, where valuation is difficult BB2 suggests disclosure at a level of 
granularity which will allow users to make their own assessment of value or apply 
the valuation model they prefer. Most users will typically state that they rather get 
the basic data not a datum that is pre-computed and manipulated or obscured by 
management. In other instances where valuation is very specific to a particular type 
of situation we suggest valuation and disclosure.  
Now it is to be admitted that while BB1 essentially discusses what already 
exists, or will soon do so given independent advances in technology, BB2 
personifies “ideas that are further departures from current practice.” The main 
argument against BB2’s premise of essentially shifting the point at which the firm 
hands over information to external users in the direction of less pre-processing is 
that users lack the ability or the willingness to deal with more information, 
suffering from lack of knowledge of key accounting issues and from information 
overload. As one commentator on an earlier version of this paper put it: “Financial 
statement users are not always as sophisticated as one might think, even 
experienced analysts. They simply do not understand, or are unaware of some of 
the more complex issues accountants currently address (say, for example, pensions 
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and financial instruments). Analysts generally recognize this and willingly leave 
such matters to accountants to deal with on their behalf. The shortcomings of the 
current system that the analysts tend to complain about are often quite mundane 
and sometimes involve issues that are intractable (but the analysts don't realize it). 
Some of the analysts I have heard from clearly want standards to help them make 
sense of the information companies provide. The supposition that analysts would 
be able to go data mining in publicly available corporate databanks to develop the 
information they need is laughable. The analysts I know would have neither the 
time nor the ability to do that. In my experience, analysts are barely able to cope 
with the volume and nature of information currently available to them, given the 
outputs they are expected to provide. For example, some analysts have to sift 
periodically through the entire universe of public companies, or substantial subsets 
of that universe, to identify potential candidates for closer scrutiny. They do so on 
the basis of a very few, quite crude analytical screens based on current reporting. 
They could do no more with the models available to them. Building better models 
to use raw corporate data is likely impracticable. If it were attempted, it would 
likely largely replicate the companies’ accounting systems. Companies might find 
it attractive to shift the cost and effort of external financial reporting onto the 
shoulders of the users, but would not be able to avoid the cost and effort of 
maintaining their own systems for internal reporting.”  
We quoted this criticism at length because it makes the case against BB2 so 
comprehensively, and indeed, goes further, in attacking the fundamental principles 
discussed earlier about users’ capabilities and cost of information processing and 
reporting that we take as the drivers of change in financial reporting. As we 
discussed then, findings of functional fixation and scandals involving analysts, 
provide some support for this skepticism. But ultimately we dismiss it as 
presenting a view of users as naïve and lackadaisical that simply does not fit the 
sophisticated users at the margin that make markets today, even if they do exist 
amongst the bulk of users.  
The best counterargument for this criticism comes not from us, but from the 
representatives of those sophisticated users, the CFA, which bluntly addresses the 
very issue underlying BB2: “A frequently heard argument against standard 
setters’ proposals to require additional disclosures is that investors already suffer 
from information overload and cannot assimilate any more. We counter that more-
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accurate and useful information never results in overload. First, whether it is used 
by investors in every case does not bear on the fact that such information should 
represent true and fair value. Second, what burdens investors is extraneous 
information—disclosure that neither informs nor enlightens the typical boilerplate 
prose that remains in companies’ financial reports year after year unchanged or 
amended in any way. It would appear to many investors that much of the currently 
available information is designed solely to meet minimum legal requirements for 
disclosure while providing little of substance to reach the sunlight. Useful 
disclosure communicates information clearly and succinctly, in formats designed to 
convey the substance of the company’s current sources of value and how those 
sources of value have changed and why. Legal obfuscation and boilerplate do 
not.” 
Technical architecture to implement BB2 in test bed:  
• The capabilities used to implement BB1 facilitate the provision of 
information in any format to any user in a variety of easily customizable 
reports.  
• User overload can be avoided by the development of dynamic stylesheets 
that allow for easy switching and comparison amongst alternative 
perspectives on the data, as in the options example. Demonstrating this 
capability was a missed opportunity in the EBRC sample reports, each of 
which presented different ways of reporting but using different rather than 
the same data. 
BB3: Support estimates and competing aggregation methods 
This building block is a natural corollary to the one above. Estimates, most 
notably, accruals, are what distinguishes net income from cash flows, as FASB 
Concept Statement No. 1 makes clear.  Making estimates for too long has been 
considered to be an art form and not a science, and therefore not subject to 
systemization. Certainly some estimates are more rigorously supported by data 
(inventory again, for example) than others (contingent environmental liabilities, for 
instance). But all presumably are arrived at through some process, if no other 
reason than the need to pass the scrutiny of the annual audit. 
 A 21st century reporting system with its enhanced capability for 
communication and access to the underlying data warehouse should have the 
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capability to ensure that estimates are accompanied by details as to the process by 
which they were arrived. For example, estimates could hyperlink to both the basis 
of the estimate as well as the method of the estimate, including a comparative table 
of how the particular estimate was performed in the past. If possible, the 
calculation of alternative calculations should be facilitated to the user, especially in 
instances where the default estimation method is inherently arbitrary, and there is 
little justification for the claim that the method the firm chooses is the best or the 
only way, such as with depreciation of assets.   
Comparability is a driving force behind the existence of accounting standards, 
and if it is known that users, dissatisfied with current disclosures, are doing their 
own calculations of estimates, then in the interest of a greater vision of 
comparability, it is better to offer alternatives to all users. Indeed, some data 
intermediates and credit entities have over the years evolved their own types of 
bottom line calculations that are different than the ones provided by companies. 
For example, S&P uses an additional calculation to take out the effect of stock 
options granted prior to the calculation of earnings per share.  
BB 4 has also been criticized in its earlier incarnations, with the prior cited 
commentator stating: “The paper seems to assume that estimates are based in all 
cases on data entered into a business system.  For relatively routine estimates, such 
as bad debts in receivables or inventory obsolescence, that may often be so.  For 
some other estimates, often key ones, there is no data system supporting 
management's estimate.” If that is indeed the case, then surely the primary 
requirements of financial reporting, as stated in the FASB Conceptual statements, 
of relevance and reliability should by themselves drive disclosures of how such 
estimates are obtained, if they are indeed not supported by the firm’s data systems. 
The electronic format of disclosures in this reporting model enables data points 
such as estimates to be enriched through links to supporting material. Being 
hyperlinked, they would not overwhelm users, who would only click through if 
they felt a need and had the sophistication to understand that material. 
Technical architecture to implement BB3 in test bed: 
• Hyperlinks, “what if” scenarios through macros embedded in spreadsheets. 
Links to authoritative standards and guidance as to the nature and content 
of estimates and accruals, such as their timing, valuation criteria and 
degree of reliability. 
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BB4: Provide Data with Context 
Consider this “map” that conveys the fact that someone is at Mt. Lander: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Data and context 
Contrast that with a topographic map of the Continental Divide in the United 
States. It conveys the same information, but also a great deal more context that 
places the party’s location in perspective. For example, different colors are used to 
indicate land, lakes or intermittent water supplies. Topographic contours link 
together points of common altitude, while their density indicates the rate of ascent. 
All that information facilitates a user of the map from efficiently and safely 
determining how to travel across this terrain and what they would find once there. 
It is this notion of context that will be an essential basis of a new reporting 
system. As one financial accounting put it: “For a number to be useful, it must be 
compared to another number. For example, is it good or bad for a company to 
report a gross margin of 22 percent? Without additional data, you can’t tell. To 
answer this question, you must know what the gross margin was in prior periods, 
what the budgeted gross margin is now, and what the industry average is. Only 
after you have compared this gross margin to the 20 percent gross margin in prior 
periods, 21.5 percent budgeted amount, and 19.5 percent industry average can you 
report that 22 percent is favorable. Too often companies fail to include comparison 
data in their reports.” 
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Figure 2: Increased context in a map setting 
 
Interestingly, FASB Concepts Statement No. 2 also discusses financial 
accounting in terms of a cartographic map, but its main focus is on the 
completeness of the map and not its inherent characteristic of placing data into 
context: “An analogy with cartography has been used to convey some of the 
characteristics of financial reporting, and it may be useful here. A map represents 
the geographical features of the mapped area by using symbols bearing no 
resemblance to the actual countryside, yet they communicate a great deal of 
information about it. The captions and numbers in financial statements present a 
‘picture’ of a business enterprise and many of its external and internal 
relationships more rigorously—more informatively, in fact—than a simple 
description of it… A ‘general purpose’ map that tried to be ‘all purpose’ would be 
unintelligible, once information about political boundaries, communications, 
physical features, geological structure, climate, economic activity, ethnic 
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groupings, and all the other things that mapmakers can map were put on it. Even 
on a so-called general purpose map, therefore, the cartographer has to select the 
data to be presented. The cartographer, in fact, has to decide to serve some 
purposes and neglect others. The fact is that all maps are really special purpose 
maps, but some are more specialized than others. And so are financial statements. 
Some of the criticisms of financial statements derive from a failure to understand 
that even a general purpose statement can be relevant to and can, therefore, serve 
only a limited number of its users’ needs.” 
The point of the technology enabled reporting system we develop in our test 
bed is that many of the constraints and hard choices about what data to include and 
what to exclude that underlie the Concept Statement’s analogy no longer bind. To 
continue that example, the prior building blocks create an environment in which 
multiple types of specialized papers can be created on demand by the user, so that 
they are no longer constrained to use the one size fits all “general purpose” map. In 
an interactive system it is possible to work backward from user needs to the 
provision of data than to be restricted to be all things to all people because of the 
necessity of pre-processing information: the exact difference, in other words, 
between the paper route maps obtained from the AAA and the electronic maps at 
www.mapquest.com which the user can zoom in or out and on which he can 
specify that hotels or tourist attractions be mapped. 
Technical architecture to implement BB4 in test bed: 
At a minimum, BB4 requires the extensive use of tagging technology, such as 
XBRL and XBRL-GL, so that data is “self describing” and easily transportable 
across applications and stylesheets without losing contextual information. But no 
single piece of data can stand alone. To be truly useful to users, data must be 
placed within a broader context, its relationship to other data made obvious in 
much the same way as the topographic contours do on this second map. 
BB1 creates a flexible alternative to the current reporting technology that will 
facilitate the distribution of disaggregate information, on a need to know basis, in 
variable format, and in short time intervals so that each one of the company’s 
stakeholders will get their choice of presentation with appropriate context. This 
technology has two main components, the back end and the front end part of the 
technology. The back end contains the corporate database (Online Transaction 
Processing System) and the data warehouse (Online Analytical Processing) of the 
Vasarhelyi & Alles                                                                        Reengineering Business Reporting        129 
company. It is unlikely that most users will get access to the organization’s OLTP 
for reasons of confidentiality and will instead interact with specialized dedicated 
applications that will use OLAP type of techniques to extract and aggregate data.  
Users of the information will be able to retrieve information in multiple 
formats. Conceptually, we see two potential approaches, namely, XBRL type of 
reports and user driven reports. Using the framework of XBRL it is possible to 
facilitate numerous types of reports that can efficiently be parsed by computers. 
Alternatively, custom reports could be generated by users by gaining access to the 
specialized reporting data warehouse. The utilization of technology expands and 
improves the representational capabilities of business reporting. The characteristics 
of these reports will be driven by the overall goal of providing context for the 
information provided: Figure 7 shows a three dimensional display of sales by 
month, product and region. The “virtual cube” could be composed of many 
dimensions (more than the three in Figure 7) by improved visualization or by the 
display of multiple tables, for example with a three dimensional cube for each 
division for the four divisions of a company. 
 
Figure 7: OLAP breakdown of data 
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Another driver of context is the drill down capability of technology based 
measurement and reporting. While the basic concepts relative to drill-downs are 
trivial, their actual capabilities can substantially improve the corporate 
measurement and disclosure. Drill-downs allow the user to disaggregate 
information provided as an aggregate. For example yearly sales could be drilled 
down to sales by month, by division, by product and all the way down to a specific 
transaction, and this transaction scrutinized in relation to its contractual terms, 
timing, levels of approval, and controls. Of course, external users would the extent 
of this drill down more constrained than for an internal user, as the details of the 
data begin to impinge on the firm’s confidentiality.  
Having a drill-down capability in the test bed is the medium to bring about the 
recalibration of the reporting process discussed above. Traditional reporting is firm 
driven with all disclosure choice done by the firm’s managers. While voluntary 
disclosures expand on the GAAP minimum, this is nonetheless very much a top 
down form of reporting in which the user has little choice and the discloser can 
potentially manipulate reports to support a desired story. The drill-down 
capabilities, based on the capabilities resulting from implementing BB1, BB2 and 
BB3, changes the business measurement process by having the firm provide access 
to a large set of basic data aggregated along key choices that the discloser makes. 
On the other hand, the user has the option, within the limits of the information 
made available, and the toolset (e.g. OLAP, stylesheets, spreadsheet downloads, 
aggregation functions, hyperlinks) to choose a set of views of the business entity 
not necessarily anticipated by the measured entity. User driven disclosure 
represents a very different set of premises where the disclosure are context driven, 
directed to the users’ needs and competencies. 
The scenarios in the figure below illustrate the kind of context that users would 
likely find useful if they could obtain access to it. 
Objective Contexts 
Performance evaluation • See high level reports of the 
company 
• Find the same type of 
comparable reports 
• Compute key performance 
indicators that give early warning 
Vasarhelyi & Alles                                                                        Reengineering Business Reporting        131 
and are of easy comparability 
Cash flow availability • See summary cash flow 
• Identify transactions that should 
be excluded from cash flow such 
as pledging of receivables, 
acceleration of collections, delay 
in supplier payments 
• Exclude these out of cash flow 
• Break cash flow generation by 
sub-units 
• Exclude /separate cash flows 
from financial subsidiaries 
• Extract cash flows from loans 
and other forms of indirect 
financing 
Malfeasance issues 
• Round trip transactions 
• Front-ending on contracts 
• Inappropriate capitalization 
 
• Drilling down into transactions 
using analytical filtering- e.g. 
large transactions, end of quarter 
transactions, transactions with 
certain partners 
• Identifying the nature of 
transactions through their 
documentation 
• Tying transactions to their 
documentation 
 
Malfeasance issues II 
• Burying results into mergers 
• Reasons for a big bang 
• Separating sub-entity results 
• Clearly identifying inter sub-
entity activity 
• Drilling down to details and 
support of reserves 
Evaluating performance of subsidiaries 
and related entities 
• Cut business reports by 
segments 
• Look at segments as individual 
entities, apply analytics to 
compensate for consolidation 
effects 
• Have access to these 
consolidation effects 
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Understanding regional markets • Cut business report by segments 
• Cut segments by region 
• Obtain results by region and by 
product 
 
Figure 8: Context based user driven disclosure 
Allied to drilldowns is the power of the hyperlinks. With Web technology 
objects can be linked through Web addresses of other objects. Hyperlink 
technology allows for linking objects of different nature and this addressing can be 
used for establishing, delimiting and determining different types of relationships. 
For example, XBRL instance documents can be pointed towards the taxonomies 
that define data relationships, Web pages can incorporate links to related pages, 
and transactions can be hyperlinked to remote databases bases with supporting 
documents, all in the interests of providing as rich a context as possible for users to 
utilize to the extent that they need and can absorb. 
BB5: “Auditability” must be an inherent characteristic of a business reporting 
system 
The only meaningful reports are credible ones and the basis of credibility in 
business is independent assurance. Hence the ability to audit financial information 
has to be built in to the financial reporting system, rather than having the auditor as 
a literally external inspector of the system’s final output. Continuous auditing must 
be incorporated into the firm’s management control infrastructure from which 
external reports are extracted. From the data level upwards there must be assurance 
that information flows throughout the firm are secure and accurate. In particular, 
with less preprocessing of information and more disaggregate data being reported, 
data level assurance will become essential. In other words, as reporting expands 
beyond the mandated financial statements, so must the scope and reach of auditing. 
Technical architecture to implement BB5 in test bed: 
There is an intensive research program into continuous auditing and its 
relationship with continuous reporting (Alles et al 2002, 2004, 2006). May ERP 
systems already have audit capability built in and independent software products 
such as Approva and ACL Caseware are now entering the market. But much work 
needs to be done on the mechanisms for integrating control monitoring and data 
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assurance into the information infrastructure of the firm that supports both 
continuous auditing and financial reporting. 
BB6: The business reporting test bed is a process and not an outcome  
This is more a philosophy than a building block, but it is listed as one because 
it is something that needs to be always kept in mind. A test bed is a means towards 
and end and not an end in itself. It is not expected to be put into practice as is but to 
serve as a device to experiment with new technologies and techniques that can be 
migrated into practice through a change management process.  In addition to 
technical development substantial education and evolution must happen for radical 
proposals to gain acceptance, such as BB2. It needs to be kept in mind that change 
that seems glacial going forward often looks dramatic in hindsight. For example, 
web-based reporting, a product of the nineties would not have been even 
conceivable even twenty years earlier but it is now part of the basic skills of the 
majority of information users and presents undeniable improvement over the 
traditional paper based model. The lesson is that any new reporting model must be 
dynamic, with deliberate built in obsolescence, so that it is continually updated as 
technology changes. It is precisely because no such mechanism is associated with 
the existing reporting system that there has been great difficulty in changing it in 
response to technological advances. 
6. CONCLUSION  
In this paper we issue a call to take a fresh approach towards the business 
reporting model to make it compatible with the 21st century information age 
economy. As technology is the driver of that economy, so it is the fundamental 
basis of the new reporting system, both as a tool for measurement and 
communication of firm performance and conceptually, in helping shape 
expectations for what is possible in a reporting system. Applying the lessons from 
earlier technology implementations, the best outcomes arise when processes are 
changes to match the capabilities of the technology rather than using technology to 
simply existing processes. Hence we argue that the kind of piece meal change 
proposed to the reporting system over the last few years will not result in truly 
innovative improvements. Instead what is needed is a collaborative effort to create 
a test bed for experimenting with change to the business reporting model, without 
preconceptions or constraints, so that it is truly of the 21st century. 
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